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Sammendrag 
Ulikhet begynner tidlig. Allerede i en alder av tre år er språkutvikling av barn med høyt utdannede 
foreldre vesentlig bedre enn barn av lavt utdannede foreldre (Heckman og Mosso, 2014; Lareau, 2011; 
Kalil, 2014; Cunha et al., 2013; Schjølberg et al., 2008). Tidlig ulikhet kan vedvare eller forverre seg 
gjennom skoleløpet og senere i livet. Data fra PISA-undersøkelsen viser at sosioøkonomiske 
forskjeller i utdanning er av tilsvarende størrelse i den norske velferdsstaten som i USA, og slike 
forskjeller ser ut til å ha blitt større de siste tiårene (Kalil, 2014). Intensive intervensjoner i tidlig 
barndom har funnet gunstige effekter på både kognitive og ikke-kognitive ferdigheter, spesielt for barn 
fra vanskeligstilte familier (Heckman og Kautz, 2014; Almond og Currie, 2011; Hoynes og 
Schanzenbach, 2018). Dette har skapt håp om at en utvidelse av offentlig subsidiert universell 
barnehage av høy kvalitet kan forbedre mulighetene til barn fra slike familier og dermed øke sosial 
mobilitet. 
 
Når generøse offentlige investeringer blir universelt tilgjengelige i stedet for målrettet mot 
vanskeligstilte grupper, vil alle foreldre ha insentiv til å endre atferd (Pop-Eleches og Urquiola, 2013; 
Böhlmark et al., 2016). De vil ha insentiver til å skaffe seg mer av den subsidierte barnehagen og å 
skaffe barnehage av høyere kvalitet. Dersom ressurssterke foreldre er mer villige og bedre i stand til å 
plassere sine barn i barnehager av høyere kvalitet sammenlignet med foreldre fra vanskeligstilte 
familier, er det ikke like klart at universell barnehage vil lykkes med å fremme sosial mobilitet (verken 
i muligheter eller i utfall). I tillegg kan barnehager tenkes å ha insentiver til å endre atferd. Hvis 
barnehager av høy kvalitet i større grad kan velge å ta inn barn fra ressurssterke familier, kan 
universell barnehage redusere sosial mobilitet. I Norge har myndighetene pålagt barnehagene strenge 
retningslinjer for strukturell kvalitet og fastsatt en lav foreldrebetaling for å sikre at systemet tilbyr 
barnehage av høy kvalitet til alle.  
 
Vi benytter detaljerte administrative data som dekker alle barn i Oslo over flere år for å beskrive 
hvordan offentlig finansiert universell barnehage blir fordelt mellom barn med ulik bakgrunn. Vi 
fokuserer spesielt på segregering etter sosioøkonomisk bakgrunn, og særlig på barn fra 
innvandrerfamilier. Tidligere studier har dokumentert at barn fra vanskeligstilte familier i mindre grad 
benytter seg av barnehage (Drange og Havnes, 2018; Drange et al., 2016; Drange og Telle, 2015; 
Cornelissen et al., 2018), et resultat som vi reproduserer. Vi bidrar imidlertid til den eksisterende 
litteraturen ved å dokumentere sterk segregering etter sosioøkonomisk bakgrunn i barnehagene i Oslo, 
og vi viser at barn fra vanskeligstilte familier ser ut til å samles i barnehager som scorer svakere på 
indikatorer på strukturell kvalitet. Vi viser også at segregeringen hovedsakelig oppstår som følge av 
foreldrenes ønsker i søknadene. 
 
Ved hjelp av data som nøyaktig plasserer barnehagene og barnas hjem geografisk, kan vi simulere 
alternative allokeringer av barna i Oslos barnehager. Vi viser at segregering av barn fra 
innvandrerfamilier kan bli vesentlig lavere ved å omfordele barn på tvers av barnehager som ligger i 
en omkrets på 500 meter fra barnas hjem. Denne alternative fordelingen reduserer andelen barn med 
innvandrerbakgrunn i de 10 prosent mest segregerte barnehagene fra den faktiske 68 prosent til 50 
prosent. På samme måte faller andelen av barnehager uten barn med innvandrerbakgrunn fra 14 
prosent til 2 prosent.   
 
1 Introduction
Inequality begins early. Long before starting school, children from disad-
vantaged families face compromised environments and parenting that inad-
equately support learning and child exploration. For example, already at
age three, language development of children of high-educated parents is sub-
stantially better than that of children of low-educated parents (Heckman
and Mosso, 2014; Lareau, 2011; Kalil, 2014; Cunha et al., 2013; Schjølberg
et al., 2008). Early inequality can persist or widen through school years
and later life. Indeed, data from the PISA study show that socioeconomic
inequalities in education are of similar magnitude in the generous welfare
state of Norway as in the USA, and socioeconomic inequalities in education
seem to have risen over the last decades (Kalil, 2014).
A main goal of public investments in child care is to provide children
from various family backgrounds with equal opportunities. In addition
to being considered fair, in the multi-period childhood model of Heckman
and Mosso (2014), early investment in children with low initial (genetic) en-
dowments can also be economically eﬃcient. In line with the predictions of
such models, intensive early-childhood interventions have shown beneﬁcial
eﬀects on both cognitive and non-cognitive skills, particularly for children
from disadvantaged backgrounds (Heckman and Kautz, 2014; Almond and
Currie, 2011; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2018). This has spurred hope
that publicly subsidized universal expansions of high-quality child care can
improve opportunities of children from disadvantaged families and thereby
raise social mobility.
However, when generous public investments are targeted exclusively
at disadvantaged children, take-up will be high, and the non-eligible ad-
vantaged children will not beneﬁt. In contrast to this, universal public
investments may also beneﬁt children from advantaged families. If advan-
taged parents to a greater extent than disadvantaged parents are able to
exploit such public investments, universal access to high-quality child care
could potentially amplify inequalities in outcomes.
When generous public investments become universally available  rather
than targeted at disadvantaged groups , parents of both advantaged
and disadvantaged children will have incentives to change behavior (Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola, 2013; Böhlmark et al., 2016).1 They will have incen-
1Böhlmark et al. (2016) provide a short review of research on parents' choice of
school for their children, and conclude that more choice tends to increase segregation.
See e.g. MacLeod and Urquiola (2013) for a review of the literature on how choice and
competition aﬀect school productivity. We are not aware of previous studies on how
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tives both to obtain more of the subsidized child care and to obtain child
care of higher quality. If advantaged parents are more willing and able
than disadvantaged parents to occupy more and higher quality child care
for their children, universal child care might not succeed in promoting social
mobility (neither in opportunities nor in outcomes). In addition, child care
centers and teachers could also have incentives to change behavior. If high
quality centers prefer children from advantaged families, universal child
care may reduce social mobility. To ensure that the system provides child
care of high and uniform quality to everyone, Norwegian policymakers have
undertaken eﬀorts in the form of generous and standardized public subsi-
dies, strict regulations of structural quality and a low parental co-payment
set by the national government.
We use detailed administrative data covering every child in Oslo over
the last decade to describe how publicly funded universal child care is dis-
tributed across advantaged and disadvantaged children. We focus specif-
ically on segregation by socioeconomic background, and in particular on
immigrant ancestry.2 Previous studies have documented that disadvan-
taged children are less likely to enroll in formal child care (Drange and
Havnes, 2018; Drange et al., 2016; Drange and Telle, 2015; Cornelissen
et al., 2018), a result that we reproduce. Using detailed administrative
register data covering every child in Oslo over the last decade, we add to
the current literature by documenting strong segregation by socioeconomic
background in child care centers, and, conserningly, that disadvantaged
children cluster in centers that seem to score weaker on indicators of cen-
ter quality.3 Indeed, we can contribute with quantitative results on the
parents choose child care, but there is a large literature on how students and parents
choose school (see e.g. recent review by Giustinelli and Manski, 2018).
2A high share of children with an immigrant background will presumably aﬀect the
language environment in the center, and may lead to a weaker language development
among children with a low proﬁciency in the language spoken by the majority. To our
knowledge, few studies have investigated how children with an immigrant background
may inﬂuence the language environment in the child care center. However, there is a
more mature literature on immigrant peers in the classroom. Jensen and Rasmussen
(2011) ﬁnd for Denmark that both native and immigrant children perform poorer if the
share of immigrants in the classroom is high, although estimates are more pronounced
for native children. Ohinata and van Ours (2013) and Geay et al. (2013) ﬁnd no eﬀects
of native children from the share of immigrant peers in the classroom in the Netherlands
and England. These latter studies do not consider outcomes among children with an
immigrant background.
3Center quality is, like school quality, inherently hard to measure (Ladd and Loeb,
2013). For school there is ample evidence of advantaged students choosing and attending
 at least what they believe to be  better schools. For example, for high-school
students, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) show that better students select into schools
of higher quality, where quality is measured as the peers' test scores. Black (1999) and
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) similarly ﬁnd that parents opt for (what they believe to
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reason for the segregation, and we show that it stems largely from similar
segregation in parental choices in the application.
With data on exact geographic location of centers and children's homes,
we can simulate alternative allocations across child care centers. We show
that segregation of children from immigrant families could decline substan-
tially by reallocating children across centers situated no more than 500
meters from the children's homes. This alternative allocation reduces the
share of children with immigrant background in the 10 percent most segre-
gated child care centers from the actual 68 percent to 50 percent. Similarly,
the share of centers with no children with immigrant background drops
from 14 percent to 2 percent. The simulation illustrates that it would be
possible to reduce segregation substantially by relatively modest changes
in the assignment rules.
2 Theoretical Considerations
In several recent studies by James Heckman and colleagues, the model of
human capital formation and social mobility by Gary Becker and Nigel
Tomes (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986) has been extended (Heckman and
Mosso, 2014). In a multi-period childhood model Heckman and Mosso
(2014) show that early investment in children with low initial (genetic) en-
dowments can be economically eﬃcient, as well as fair. Even in the absence
of inequality aversion, it can be socially beneﬁcial to undertake compen-
sating behavior through early investments in children's human capital (i.e.
allocate higher early investments to children of low initial endowments than
to children of high initial endowments). In the model, early investments
improve children's later skills, which again raises the productivity of later
period investments.4 For compensating behaviors to be optimal, it is suf-
ﬁcient that initial endowments and investments are substitutes.
All else equal, public investments in child care for disadvantaged chil-
dren will enhance their development and reduce inequality. For several
reasons, eﬀects on inequality of public investments in universal child care
is less clear, as it would depend on interactions between public and private
investments across advantaged and disadvantaged children. For example,
advantaged parents may be more able than disadvantaged parents to in-
be) better schools. These studies ﬁnd that access to schools of perceived higher quality
improves the students' results, though typically only modestly.
4But later in childhood it is eﬃcient to invest more in higher-skill students than in
lower-skill students, as the payoﬀ of investment in the last childhood period is always
higher for the high than the low skill child.
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crease the productivity of public investments (e.g. as private and pub-
lic investments are complements), or public investments may crowd out
private investments more among disadvantaged families.5 If we assume
no crowding out, and that private and public investments are substitutes,
then public investments increase the overall investment in both advantaged
and disadvantaged children to the same extent, but  given the standard
assumption of skill formation being concave in investments  the improve-
ment in outcomes would be higher for the disadvantaged children since their
initial level of private investment is lower. If we assume, however, that ad-
vantaged parents are better at transforming public investments into skill
formation (e.g. if private and public investments are complements for ad-
vantaged children), universal provision of public child care, though possibly
equally increasing the investment in both advantaged and disadvantaged
children, could improve outcomes more for advantaged than disadvantaged
children, i.e. having a dis-equalizing eﬀect.
Publicly funded universal child care may not improve the equality of
opportunity if it also changes the behavior of parents or child care insti-
tutions (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013; Böhlmark et al., 2016). When
parents optimize the quality of care received by their children, publicly
funded child care give parents incentives to occupy both more child care
and child care of higher quality. If advantaged parents are willing6 to or
more able than disadvantaged parents to occupy more and better child care
for their children, universal child care can increase inequality (both in op-
portunities and outcomes). First, such selection might cause advantaged
children to attend centers of higher quality as measured by statically child-
unrelated indicators like current staﬀ quality and physical environments.
Second, it could lead to clustering of advantaged children in certain centers,
with associated beneﬁcial peer eﬀects.7
5Kalil (2014) argue that advantaged parents both invest more and are more able to
use the investments to improve the development of their children than disadvantaged
parents. When it comes to crowding out, results appear less clear. For example, Gelber
and Isen (2013) ﬁnd evidence of crowding in of parental investments for children in Head
Start, while Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) ﬁnd some evidence of more crowding out
of parental investments for high-school students of lower skills than their high-skill peers
(when getting access to a higher quality school).
6Parents may in fact prefer socioeconomic diversity among the children in the center
they send their child, but over time segregation could still emerge in the presence of
segregation dynamics with tipping (Schelling, 1969; Card et al., 2008).
7While associations between a child's own family background and its future outcomes
is well studied, it is not similarly clear how the characteristics of a child's peers' can and
will aﬀect its future outcomes. However, a growing body of research using randomized
and natural experiments to address the endogeneity of peer group formation, tends to
ﬁnd support for peer eﬀects, although estimates vary depending on the outcome and age
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Child care centers and teachers could also have incentives to change
behavior as a universal child care system expands. They might have in-
centives to do so in order to reduce costs or secure the quality of current
children's peers.8 Centers can maximize child quality through recruiting
children of more resourceful parents, for example by targeting information
and promotion campaigns to selected neighborhoods or parents, or by un-
dertaking a more accommodating attitude toward such parents (Bauhoﬀ,
2012). They might also oﬀer amenities particularly appreciated by re-
sourceful parents (Aizer et al., 2005), like geographic location (e.g. in ad-
vantaged neighborhoods), spending much time with the children outdoors,
providing particularly healthy food or emphasizing reading and learning ac-
tivities. Moreover, if allowed, centers may perform supply-side selection by
manipulating which children are granted an oﬀer among those who applies.
Overall, centers establishing a reputation of high-quality, may over time
attract an increasing share of children from advantaged families, further
improving quality (see e.g. MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015).
Teachers or other staﬀ may also prefer advantaged children.9 Thus, not
only will advantaged parents aim to enroll their children in centers with
better teachers (and centers will try to attract both better teachers and
more advantaged children), the better teachers will also select into centers
with more advantaged children. Over time, such selection dynamics could
of the children studied (Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011).
8In health economics such supply-side selection has been studied theoretically for
a long time (Breyer et al., 2011; Gaynor and Town, 2011), and there are also some
empirical contributions. Bauhoﬀ (2012) study supply-side selection of health insurance
plans. The market for such plans in Germany is tightly regulated (to avoid such risk-
selection), but he still ﬁnds that plans respond more favorably to applicants that appear
lower-cost (compared with higher-costs) on observable characteristics. Duggan (2000)
analyzes eﬀects of a reform that increased the funding of low-income (i.e. under-insured)
patients to see if responses were diﬀerent across private for-proﬁt, private not-for-proﬁt
and government-owned hospitals. He found that the increased funding spurred private
hospitals to treat more low-income patients, but he found no improvement in health for
these patients. The lack of beneﬁts for the indigent is related to the ownership structure
of the hospitals, in particular to the windfall of the public hospitals being bailed out by
the local governments and thus not improving the quality of the treatment. Aizer et al.
(2005) use the same reform as Duggan (2000), and ﬁnd that it resulted in desegregation
of poor publicly insured mothers from separate, often public, hospitals. The moving of
aﬀected mothers suggest that their choice were, before the reform, constrained and that
the reform improved their welfare. Duggan (2002) looked at the same reform as Duggan
(2000) and found that not-for-proﬁt hospitals in areas with many for-proﬁt hospitals
responded more (than not-for-proﬁt hospitals in areas with few for-proﬁt hospitals),
which indicates more scope to risk-select if in an area with many public centers (and
few private), compared with areas with only private centers.
9In high school, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) ﬁnd that better students are
matched with better teachers, and they argue that this is a dynamic result of teach-
ers' preferences.
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materialize with the most advantaged children occupying the highest qual-
ity centers, leaving the children from disadvantaged families in low-quality
child care. We will then be in a situation where most public funding is
allocated to the most resourceful children, which is the opposite of the in-
tended compensating behavior of expanding child care, even if this was not
intended by policy makers. This can deteriorate the relative opportuni-
ties of disadvantaged children, with associated expansions in inequality of
outcomes.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Child Care Expansion in Norway
Child care in Norway is now practically universal. In 2009 a policy intro-
duced the legal right to a publicly funded and certiﬁed child care slot if
the child was born prior to September the previous year.10 Child care in-
stitutions (both public and private) are strictly regulated, with provisions
on staﬀ qualiﬁcations, number of children per adult and per teacher, size
of play area, and to some extent educational content. Institutions should
be run by an educated child care teacher responsible for management and
educational content. The child care teacher education is a three year col-
lege degree, including supervised practice in a child care center. National
child care regulations specify that there should be at least one educated
child care teacher per 10 children aged below three, and one per 18 chil-
dren aged 3-5. In addition, municipal regulations specify that there should
be one adult per three children below three, and one adult per six children
above three. There are no educational requirements for the additional staﬀ.
In Oslo, about 60 percent of child care institutions are public, while the
remaining are privately operated. Private centers can be both for-proﬁt and
not-for-proﬁt. Both types of institutions require municipal approval and
supervision to be entitled to federal subsidies that cover around 80 percent
of costs.11 The very generous subsidies implies that it is not worthwhile
for wealthy parents to try to set up alternative private child care arrange-
ments of higher quality, since the quality of the publicly subsidized centers
is already very high and since violations of the maximum co-payment, in-
cluding pecuniary or in-kind side-payments and donations, would disqualify
10Children born September 1st and onward are not guaranteed a slot before the coming
autumn, but the vast majority will enroll during their second year.
11Parental co-payment is capped since 2003 at around 2400 NOK (approximately 400
US$) per month.
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the center from the very generous public subsidies. As a result of an expan-
sion of child care slots and a lower maximum price, the share of children
enrolled in centers rose sharply over the last decade. This was particularly
true for the youngest children. In 2011 more than 90 percent of children
aged 1-5 attended child care, and more than 98 percent of the children
starting school in Norway had attended a child care center.12
3.2 Child Care Supply in Oslo
During the years our data covers (2005-2013), the main allocation of child
care slots in Oslo took place in a centralized application round in March
to May. Parents could rank up to seven child care centers in their city
district when applying, and their ranking could be a mix of private and
municipal institutions. With minor exceptions, private institutions had
full discretion over their admissions based on applicant lists sent from the
city administration, while municipal centers used an assignment lottery to
oﬀer slots prior to 2008, and birth date in subsequent years.
In reality there was no opening for advantaged parents to set up private
alternatives of superior quality outside of the publicly funded and certiﬁed
system. Indeed, when operating within the system (which everyone did
because it was economically very attractive), providers were impeded from
using parental payments to segregate children or to improve quality. How-
ever, strict quality regulations (of which parents were aware) prohibited
providers from supplying low-quality care. Since access to child care within
the system became a legal right in 2009, private alternatives of low-quality
outside the system are hardly worthwhile any more (over-subscription to
care within the system was extensive until a few years ago, but to a lesser
extent for the later cohorts in our sample).
Setting up of private care (within the system) was regulated, so that
providers would generally not be allowed to set up a child care center in
areas with suﬃcient institutions already (and they might loose the permis-
sion if they did not follow the quality regulations). Given that municipal
centers randomly assigned children (within centers that parents had ap-
plied for), there were limited possibilities for this type of centers to cream
skim. Moreover, national wage regulations (and the quality regulations)
made it virtually impossible to save by hiring low-cost/low-quality staﬀ.
The ﬁxed income (limited parental co-payment and ﬁxed public subsidy)
made it very hard to use higher wages to attract better teachers. More-
over, centers received a certain extra subsidy when enrolling children with
12See http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/nokkeltall/likestilling
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an immigrant background to secure that these children were allocated some
teacher resources in order to develop proﬁciency in the majority language.
This should facilitate similar quality across care institutions.
3.3 Child Care Quality
Though public regulations secured a minimum quality standard for all child
care centers in Norway, there were several ways in which centers could dif-
fer in aspects of quality. One such aspect was teacher competency. While
the expansion of available child care slots from 2003 and onward was ex-
tensive, the education of teachers did not keep a similar pace. Thus, there
was a shortage of competent teachers, and some centers failed to recruit a
suﬃcient amount of educated staﬀ. To be allowed to run a center without
suﬃcient staﬀ with required education, the center had to apply for an ex-
emption from the municipality. These exemptions were often granted, as
the municipality wanted to secure a suﬃcient number of child care slots.
Another way in which the center could increase quality and attract children
from advantaged backgrounds was to promote amenities like geographic lo-
cation, staﬀ competency, or emphasis on learning activities. It was also to
a limited extent possible to reduce the costs of the center through various
kinds of voluntary parental participation, like being in the board, cutting
lawns, shuing snow, supporting employees at day trips, etc. This is un-
likely to enable for-proﬁt centers to extract a higher proﬁt, but it could
secure a better oﬀer for children enrolled, and subsequently attract chil-
dren from more advantaged families. Moreover, the private centers could
inﬂuence the composition of enrolled children. One obvious way to exert
such inﬂuence would be to set up the center in a geographical area with
resourceful parents, since the catchment areas of centers was largely de-
ﬁned by geographical vicinity. But it could also be done by navigating the
admission system to attract or/and admit less demanding children. One
could, for example, attract applications from presumably tranquil children
by allocating resources to characteristics assumed to be appreciated more
by such parents (books, safety, out-door activities, etc.). Since private cen-
ters have some - though limited - discretion with respect to whom among
the applicants to admit, there is also some room for cream skimming among
the applicants.
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4 Data and Methods
As noted in the introduction, we want to document descriptively how uni-
versal child care can be allocated across advantaged and disadvantaged chil-
dren, and speciﬁcally how it may aﬀect socioeconomic segregation in early
childhood. In praticular, we try to explore whether the segregation cor-
relates with indicators of center quality, and explore how parental choices
in applications and residential segregation can explain the segregation. To
shed light on these questions we use the followng detailed administrative
data covering every child in Oslo over the last decade.
4.1 Data Sources, Variables and Indicators of Segregation
We have access to data from the Municipality of Oslo containing records
with information on applications for and enrollments in virtually all child
care institutions in Oslo for the years 20052013, including both public
and private child care institutions. Applications, enrollment and oﬀers are
recorded with date of receipt, date of ﬁrst attendance and date the oﬀer
was made, respectively. Since the dataset includes the unique oﬃcial per-
sonal identiﬁer of every child, we can link with the population register of
Statistics Norway to identify the child's parents. Linking with other reg-
istries, we obtain information about the child (birth year and month, sex,
country of birth, geographic location of residency, etc.) and the parents
(birth year and month, sex, country of birth, geographic location of resi-
dency, identiﬁer of every child, marital status and identity of the spouse,
education, earnings, income, drawing disability pensions, receiving (means
tested) social assistance, etc.). Thus, data allow us to identify the immi-
gration status of every resident, and we use this to deﬁne children from
immigrant families (children with immigrant background is sometimes used
synonymously) as children i) who immigrated to Norway, ii) whose mother
and father immigrated to Norway or iii) whose four grandparents were born
outside Norway.
Furthermore, we have access to Oslo municipality's database on test
scores at school entry for every child in Oslo. This provides information
about scores on performance tests in Norwegian language, conducted in
April of ﬁrst grade. The tests are designed nationally, and are intended
to help identify under-performing children, enabling schools to allocate
resources to these children. The language test maps the ability to write
letters, recognize written letters, identify spoken letters, combine sounds,
write words, read words and read simple sentences.
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As indicator of segregation we focus on the children's immigrant back-
ground, but also include the following measures: father is a high-school
drop out, a parent receives disability pension or social assistance, mother
is not working and parents are not married. To measure the extent of seg-
regation, we will mainly rely on plots of the full distributions or of values
from lower/upper deciles for the child care centers. In addition, we will
provide common indexes of segregation (Massey and Denton, 1988). To
capture (un)evenness we report the Gini coeﬃcient (G) and the dissimilar-
ity index (D), both taking value 1 under full segregation and 0 when the
proportion in each child care center is the same as the proportion in the
overall population. The value of D represents the share of the group that
would need to change center to make the group similarly represented in all
centers.
To capture exposure, i.e the degree of potential interaction between
group members, we report the isolation index (S) and a measure of over-
exposure (R). The isolation index (S) is deﬁned as the likelihood that a
disadvantaged child has another disadvantaged child in its own center. Sim-
ilarly, R captures own-group exposure for all children, but averaged over
both groups, and normalized by the segregation that would have occurred
under random assignment of children to centers (following Böhlmark et al.
2016, appendix 2; see also Aslund and Nordstrom Skans 2009). The inter-
pretation is that the risk of a child sharing center with another child from
its own group is R times what it would have been had the children been
randomly assigned to centers. While R is one if there is no segregation
relative to random assignment, it can both be below one (e.g. if policies
are enforced to reduce segregation) and above one (if people self-select by
similar characteristics), S is zero if there is no isolation and one under full
isolation (i.e. just like D and G).
It is inherently hard to capture child care quality (see e.g. Ladd and
Loeb (2013) for a discussion on measures of school quality). In principle we
would like to capture the center's ability  including possible peer eﬀects
- to improve the development of the child. Indeed, since the needs of
children diﬀer with individual characteristics and development stage, what
constitutes high quality for one child may not be beneﬁcial for all. In
the school literature, characteristics of the peers are a common quality
indicator (Chetty et al., 2011). We will also brieﬂy present some data on
the number of adults per child and characteristics of the staﬀ, as well as
test scores in primary school for the children from the center, though the
latter may obviously be endogenous (especially since we do not have ability
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indicators before entry to child care). Clearly, neither of these measures
capture quality in a comprehensive and satisfactory way, and our empirical
investigations will focus mainly on describing segregation.
4.2 Sample Deﬁnitions
We have arranged the data into ﬁve analytic samples. The ﬁrst analytic
sample uses information at the child level. Here, we are interested in the
characteristics of the children who do and do not attend child care before
school-starting age. We identify children who could have been attending
child care (using complete and dated records of all residents in Oslo) and
children who did attend. To know whether children attended before school
start, we can only use children born before 2008 (since they start school
in August 2013, which is the last calendar year we can observe child care
attendance in our data). Thus, we use birth cohorts 2004-2007 and capture
attendance over the calendar years 2004-2013. This dataset includes 27 544
children.
In the second analytic sample, we use information at the child care
center level. In this dataset we include all children attending a child care
center in Oslo as of January 1st 2011. This implies that we include children
born 2005-2010. By linking on information of the children in the center at
January 1st 2011, we can describe the characteristics of their families using
data (like family income) from 2010. We will use this dataset to study
diﬀerences across the centers with respect to characteristics of the children
attending the center. To focus on child care centers, i.e. excluding family
run day care of more varying quality, as well as ensuring results being more
robust to outliers, we have excluded child care institutions with less than
10 children. This dataset includes 653 child care centers.
The third analytic sample is a subset of the second analytic sample, i.e.
the subset of centers that we are able to uniquely identify in employer-
employee databases maintained by Statistics Norway. In addition to allow-
ing us to collect individual information on the employees of each center,
these databases also include exact geographic location of each center. Since
we know the exact geographic residential location of all the children's homes
(from the population registry), we can calculate the distance from every-
one's home to the child care centers. The dataset includes 440 child care
centers, but we manually uniquely identiﬁed the geographic location of 79
more centers, leaving us with a sample of 519 centers for the analysis of
distance to the centers in Section 6.2.
In the fourth analytic sample which is also at the center level, we iden-
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tify the children who applied for a child care slot in a particular center.
The sample includes ﬁrst time applications submitted for the birth cohorts
2004-2007 over the calendar years 2004-2013, and a family's ﬁrst priority
center.13 We will use this dataset to study diﬀerences across the cen-
ters with respect to characteristics of the children applying for the center.
Again, we exclude centers with less than 10 applying children. This dataset
includes 529 centers.
The ﬁfth analytic sample is at the child level. This dataset is used to
explore if the children attending a child care center diﬀer systematically
from the children who applied (ﬁrst priority) to the center. To do so we
need to identify children who attended the center of ﬁrst priority in their
application. We start with the ﬁrst application (available 2004-2013) of
all children born 2004-2007, which comprises 34 723 children. Then we
identify the center that this child attended at January 1st in the calendar
year after the calendar year of application (or the next calendar year),
which is available for the subset of 28 706 children. We can then compare
the center that the child applied for with the center that the child ended
up attending, given that the child did in fact start in a center in Oslo.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Utilization and Segregation
5.1.1 Utilization of Child Care by Socioeconomic Background
Using the ﬁrst analytic sample, i.e. all children in birth cohorts 2004-2007,
who resided in Oslo at the entry of the calendar year they turned 6 (i.e.
January of the calendar year in which they start school in August), we
see from Figure 1 that about 95 percent had attended child care (in Oslo)
before school start. The average participation rate hides the fact that at-
tendance rates rose considerably in this period, it was 87 percent for the
2004 cohort, 91 percent for the 2005 cohort and 95 percent for the 2006
cohort. From the ﬁgure we observe that children from disadvantaged back-
grounds unsurprisingly have somewhat lower attendance rates, as measured
along a number of dimensions. The attendance rates are particularly low
for children from immigrant families (about 90 percent) and children of a
disabled parent (about 86 percent).
13Due to a restrictive storage policy in the municipality, data on children born in
January and February 2004 were deleted from the application data base before we got
access to it. We are therefore not able to include these children in our sample.
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In Figure 2 we show the number of years a child has been enrolled in
child care (in Oslo) before school start. On average, a child is enrolled close
to four years. Again, we see that children from more disadvantaged back-
grounds tend to spend less time in child care than their more advantaged
peers. In particular, children with immigrant background spend about a
year less in child care before school start than the average child. It appears,
both here and in subsequent results, that marital status of the parents is
not correlated with socio-economic disadvantage. In Norway cohabitation
is very common, and most children are born by cohabiting parents.
Given these socioeconomic diﬀerences in child care attendance, we would
also expect a positive correlation between child care attendance and later
school performance. We conﬁrm this in Figure 3, where we see that among
children with more child care experience, a lower share scored concerningly
low on a language test in ﬁrst grade. We would not only expect socioe-
conomic diﬀerences between observable categories (e.g. between children
from immigrant families and other children), but also within such cate-
gories. For example, among children from immigrant families, we would
expect the most advantaged to attend child care more and earlier than the
disadvantaged. In Table 1 we have regressed test scores on the number
of years in child care before school for each indicated socioeconomic cat-
egory separately. The general picture conﬁrms our expectation: Within
each category, those who attended child care longer are less likely to score
concerningly low on the test. Though the latter result could also reﬂect a
causal eﬀect of attending child care, there are clearly important selection
processes determining child care attendance.
5.1.2 Segregation by Socioeconomic Background
Using the second analytic sample (i.e. all children enrolled in publicly
subsidized child care in Oslo in 2011), we see from Figure 4 that there are
a few very large centers with more than 100 children, and many smaller.
In the following plots and analyses, we have only included centers with at
least 10 children.
In Figure 5 we see that children from immigrant families clearly are
unevenly distributed across centers. In about 15 percent of the centers,
there are no children from immigrant families, while in the 10 percent
centers with the highest share of children from immigrant families, about
80 percent have such background.
In Figure 6 we show the rate of the mean of the given variable for the top
and bottom decile of centers. For a number of measures, it is evident that
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disadvantaged and advantaged children are clustered in diﬀerent centers.
Starting with children of immigrant ancestry, ﬁndings from Figure 5 are
conﬁrmed. Proceeding to the share of children with mothers not working,
we see that in the highest decile of child care centers almost 60 percent of
children are from families where the mother does not work. In the lowest
decile, the corresponding ﬁgure is less than 10 percent. We see a similar
segregation across all background characteristics, and note that while none
of the children come from families on welfare in the lowest decile, almost
30 percent have this background in the highest decile of child care centers.
These clear patterns of segregation are also evident from the segregation
indexes presented in Table 2. As we will return to below, quite some
of the segregation across centers in Oslo can be attributed to residential
segregation, but from the lower panel of Table 2 we observe that substantial
segregation remains when we calculate the indexes within the city districts
(at the time the 15 districts of Oslo are identical to the catchment areas of
the centers).
In Figure 7 we see that the test scores of the children in ﬁrst grade
diﬀer remarkably for children across centers. Note that this might not only
reﬂect selection into centers, but could also reﬂect the centers' ability to
enhance child development.
Does this segregation suggest that advantaged children occupy the cen-
ters of higher quality? As already noted, it is hard to measure the quality
of educational institutions (Ladd and Loeb, 2013), so we will look at several
rough indicators of center quality (using the third analytic sample). Drange
and Ronning (2017) rely on random assignment of children across centers,
and ﬁnd that the share of male employees in the centers is the best variable
to capture latent center quality. In addition we also include the number
of college educated adults per child, the share of the employees that are
non-immigrants, and the score of the children on test scores in ﬁrst grade.
In Table 3 we present the correlations between these rough quality indica-
tors and the indicators of family background applied above, and results are
largely as expected. For example, children from immigrant families tend
to be in centers with fewer male adults, fewer college educated adults per
child, more immigrant employees and in centers where the children score
weaker on tests scores in ﬁrst grade. Similar associations are present for
the other indicators of disadvantage. Though not conclusive, these ﬁndings
are consistent with the conjecture that children from advantaged families
are not only clustering in the same centers, but that they are clustering in
centers of superior quality, relegating children from disadvantaged families
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to the remaining child care centers.
5.1.3 Segregation by Center Ownership
We keep in mind from Section 3 that we are interested in whether the small
diﬀerences in rules that regulate enrollment in private vs. municipal child
care centers might be associated with the background of the children who
actually enroll. Some previous studies indicate increased segregation when
parents/students can choose private schools or private schools can cream
skim students (Card et al., 2008; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Böhlmark et al.,
2016). To look closer at segregation by center ownership we study the
children enrolled in child care in Oslo in 2011 (still the second analytic
sample), and explore if there are socioeconomic diﬀerences across private
and municipal centers. From Figure 8 we observe that there tend to be
a signiﬁcantly higher share of advantaged children in private compared
to municipal centers. For example, the share of children with immigrant
background is 13 percent in private centers and 31 percent in municipal
centers. We note from Table 4 that the share of children from municipal
centers who score concerningly low on tests in ﬁrst grade is signiﬁcantly
higher than the share of children from private centers. Household income
of families enrolled in municipal child care centers is considerably lower
than in private centers, and, on average, fathers have about 1.6 years less
schooling.
5.2 Parental Application Behavior
We have seen that there is considerable segregation in child care centers
in Oslo, and, at least for certain background characteristics such as im-
migrant status, segregation is also present within city districts and across
private and municipal centers. We proceed by looking at parents' appli-
cation behavior as a possible explanation for this segregation. Using the
fourth analytic sample (i.e. all children applying for the ﬁrst time to pub-
licly subsidized child care in Oslo over 2004-2013), we see from Figure 9 that
there are excessive diﬀerences in characteristics of children across applica-
tions to child care centers. Note that only centers with at least 10 applying
children are included. Applications of children from immigrant families
are unevenly distributed across centers. For the lowest decile (measured
as the share of children with immigrant background) of the centers, there
are about 1 percent of children from immigrant families applying, while in
the 10 percent centers with the highest share of children from immigrant
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families applying, 86 percent have such background. It seems clear that
parents with and without immigrant background apply for diﬀerent child
care centers. This is also the case for other socioeconomic characteristics
(see Figure 9) and conﬁrmed using the segregation indexes (see Table 5).
Overall, these patterns correspond to what we found in Figure 6 and Table
2, and implies that the socioeconomic segregation of enrolled children, can
largely be explained by parental application behavior.14 Not fully, however,
as we observe that the segregation indexes generally suggest more limited
segregation in applications than in enrollment.
In Figure 10 we see how parental background is associated with appli-
cations for municipal vs private child care centers. For example, it is clear
that families with an immigrant background have a higher likelihood of
applying for a municipal child care center than a private one. This may be
explained by information asymmetries, preferences for this type of center,
or it might reﬂect that parents prefer a nearby center, and that centers
close to these families to a larger extent are run by the municipality.
5.3 Do Private Centers Skim the Cream?
Are there indications that private child care centers enroll a higher share of
advantaged children than those who apply? To explore this, we use our ﬁfth
analytic sample to check whether the children who attend private centers
diﬀer systematically from the children who applied to private centers, and
similarly for municipal centers. We keep in mind from Section 4.2 that we
consider the families' ﬁrst ranked center in this analysis. Figure 11 displays
the share of children with the given background characteristic who applied
and attended private vs. municipal centers, and the Figure suggests some
cream skimming. For example, we see that while 34 percent of the chil-
dren applying to municipal centers had an immigrant background, an even
higher share of children who ended up attending a municipal center had
such background (37 percent). For private centers, however, the share of
children with an immigrant background applying was 16 percent, while the
rate attending was 14 percent. Thus, municipal centers enroll 3 percent-
age points more children with immigrant background than those applying,
while private centers enroll 2 percentage points fewer children with immi-
grant background than those who applied. This is in line with a hypothesis
that private centers enroll disproportionally fewer children with an immi-
grant background than the mean of their application pool, and indicates
14As above, substantial segregation remains when we calculate the indexes within city
districts; see lower panel of Table 5.
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that private child care centers contribute to the segregation in child care.
We note, however, that the contribution to the overall observed segrega-
tion that may stem from private centers' cream skimming, seems limited
compared with the contribution from parental application behavior.
6 Simulations
One reason to subsidize child care is to improve the language skills of chil-
dren from immigrant families. Improving skills in the language spoken by
the majority, requires that this is in fact the language spoken by the adults
and the children in the child care center. Excessive segregation, however,
will result in child care centers where few or none of the children speak
the language spoken by the majority. This may lead to weaker language
development among children with a low proﬁciency in the language spoken
by the majority. If some centers almost exclusively enroll children with im-
migrant background, and others enroll few or no children with immigrant
background, policies to reduce segregation may be called for.
Segregation would also evolve with random allocation of children across
centers, in which case policies to reduce segregation should be possible with-
out raising costs in the form of e.g. increased travel distances. If so, un-
controversial policies to reduce segregation stemming from randomization
should be available. But segregation may also be a result of residential seg-
regation and associated travel distances from home to centers, or parental
choices based on e.g. matches between the child's needs and character-
istics of the center, in which case policies to reduce segregation can be
controversial. In such cases, policymakers should weigh the possible costs
of restricting parental choices and the possible costs of segregation.
In this section we undertake simulations to compare actual enrollment
in child care centers with random enrollment and with the enrollment that
minimizes segregation given that travel distance from home to the center
should not exceed 500 meters. The simulations yield hypothetical outcomes
that are only feasible if not counteracted by e.g. parental behavior. How-
ever, since child care in Norway is generously subsidized, heavily regulated
and of high quality, there exists no alternative in the fully private mar-
ket. In fact, except for postponing entry by a few months and applying
for transfer to another center (Drange and Havnes, 2018), opting out of
the system would not really be an attractive option in the long run. The
outcome of the simulated policies may thus be a reasonable estimate of
what could be achieved by changes in the assignment rules in this context.
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6.1 Randomly Allocating Children to Centers
As we have already discussed, a certain amount of segregation of children
based on background characteristics should be expected given the actual
residential segregation across any city, including Oslo. Since children pri-
marily will be assigned a child care slot in the city district where they live,
residential segregation will carry over to segregation in child care centers.
To look closer into how much of the observed segregation in child care
centers that may and may not be explained by residential segregation, we
have simulated two sets of random draws (obeying the actual number of
children in each center) displayed in Figure 12 (based on the second ana-
lytic sample). In one set we randomly assign children to centers across the
entire city independent on their city district of residence (black area). As
expected from well-known socioeconomic residential segregation in most
bigger Western cities, we see that this generates much smaller segregation
by immigrant background in the child care centers than the actual diﬀer-
ences (light gray dots, cf. Figure 5). In another set of random draws ,
we assign children randomly to a child care center within the child's city
district of residence (dark gray area). As expected, this generates more
segregation than in the case with random draw to any child care center
in Oslo, but it is still considerably lower than the segregation we actually
observe (light gray dots).
6.2 Minimizing Center Segregation within Neighborhoods
To further explore the role of residential segregation in explaining the clus-
tering by immigrant background in child care centers, we calculate the
shortest distance (beeline) in meters between the family home and the child
care center that the child actually attended (in the third analytic sample).
For the actual allocation of children, the mean and median distance is 1338
and 595 meters. First, we study how segregation by immigrant background
changes if we let two children switch child care center if such a switch re-
duces (weakly) the travel distance of both of them.15 From the dark gray
dots in Figure 13 we see that pairwise reallocating children to reduce the
travel distance from home to the center for both of them, do reduce the seg-
regation of children with immigrant background in the centers somewhat.
15We did this simulation by randomly sorting all the children, and change the child care
center of the two ﬁrst children if the travel distance declined (weakly) for both of them,
change the child care center for the two next children if travel distance declined (weakly)
for both of them, and so on for all pairs of children in the dataset. We repeated this
procedure 5,000 times, and though more such swaps exist, the results tended to change
little after about thousand loops.
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This suggest that allocating children to their nearest child care center, like
is common for schools in Oslo, could reduce segregation.
Second, from the black dots in the same ﬁgure, we see that segrega-
tion by immigrant background is reduced further if we reallocate children
to minimize segregation by immigrant background given that the travel
distance from the home of each child to the child care center cannot ex-
ceed 500 meters or increase. Doing so results in an allocation where the
share of children with immigrant background in the 10 percent most seg-
regated child care centers declines from the actual 68 percent (light gray
dots) to 50 percent (black dots). Interestingly, the rate of children with
immigrant background drops from above 90 to below 60 percent in the
ﬁve most segregated centers. Similarly, the share of centers with no chil-
dren from immigrant families drops from 14 percent (light gray dots) to
2 percent (black dots). This drop in segregation is also evident from the
segregation indexes presented in Table 6. The simulation illustrates that it
would be possible to reduce segregation by immigrant background in child
care centers substantially by making relatively modest changes in the as-
signment rules. Whether possible assimilation gains from such a change in
assignment rules are suﬃcient to justify the accompanying restrictions to
parents' choice of center, is ultimately a question of political preferences.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the allocation of publicly funded child care in a country
with a very extensive provision of universal child care, and with a subsidy
system that is designed to provide uniform and high quality child care for
all children. In Oslo, public child care slots are assigned among applicants
in a lottery (Drange and Havnes, 2018), strict regulations of structural
quality applies to all centers and the maximum co-payment of parents is
decided by the national government. This should presumably limit ad-
vantaged parents ability to use for example networks or side-payments to
disproportionally occupy care of higher quality. Still, we describe excessive
segregation of children by socioeconomic background across centers. The
segregation is mainly driven by advantaged parents applying to the same
centers, presumably contributing to these centers becoming of higher qual-
ity. We ﬁnd some signs that private centers take advantage of their discre-
tion with respect to which children to admit by enrolling disproportionally
more advantaged children than those who applied. Largely, however, the
socioeconomic clustering in the child care centers stems from application
behavior and socioeconomic residential segregation. However, we show that
the segregation by immigrant background can be reduced substantially by
22
reallocating children across centers only 500 meters from the family homes.
Expanding child care to new groups involves behavioral responses that
can impede disadvantaged children's access to child care and the quality
of the child care available to them. Our empirical results suggest that
advantaged parents may be better at navigating the system and thereby
take better advantage of the public funding to enhance the opportunities of
their children. Thus, the need for publicly funded compensatory measures
to secure the opportunities of children from disadvantaged backgrounds is
very unlikely to be eliminated by a universal child care system of high qual-
ity. A main take-away from our study is that the need for well-targeted
and publicly funded compensatory measures to disadvantaged children is
not automatically eliminated by a universal system  not even when the
universal system is heavily regulated, generously subsidized and generally
of high quality. Policymakers can take this into account, for example, by
attributing disproportionally higher subsidies to children from lower socioe-
conomic backgrounds. This can and is done in diﬀerent ways, for example
by restricting intensive early-childhood interventions to children from dis-
advantaged backgrounds or by adjusting public funding to child care centers
to compensate for children's disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds.
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Figure 1: Participation Rates of Children
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Immigrant background
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Father high−school dropout
All children
Fraction of children in cohorts 2004-2007 living in Oslo at the beginning of the
calendar year they start school (in August), who had been to child care in Oslo
before school start. Participation rates within given groups.
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Figure 2: Years in Child Care before School Start
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Mother not working
Immigrant background
Social assistance
Disabled parent
Father high−school dropout
All children
Parents not married
Years in child care before school start for children in cohorts 2004-2007 living in
Oslo at the beginning of the calendar year they start school (in August), including
only children who had been to child care before school start. Time within given
groups.
Figure 3: Years in Child Care and Concerningly Low Score in Norwegian
in School
.1 .2 .3 .4
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(0,1]
0
Fraction of children in cohorts 2004-2007 living in Oslo at the beginning of the
calendar year they start school (in August), who score concerningly low on a test
in Norwegian in ﬁrst grade. Fractions given by number of years in child care in
Oslo before school start.
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Table 1: Concerningly Low Score in Norwegian in School
Coeﬃcient (St.Err.) N
All childrena -0.07** (0.002) 22 911
Immigrant background -0.04** (0.004) 7 570
Mother not working -0.05** (0.005) 4 778
Parents not married -0.06** (0.004) 7 368
Father high-school dropout -0.06** (0.004) 5 763
Social assistance -0.05** (0.007) 2 227
Disabled parent -0.07** (0.015) 462
Regression results for the association between years in child care and the likelihood
of obtaining a concerningly low test score in Norwegian in ﬁrst grade. Each
line represents the results from a separate (linear) regression (no controls unless
otherwise noted). Sample of children in cohorts 2004-2007 who lived in Oslo at
the beginning of the calendar year they turned 6. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 5 and 1 percent level (two-sided t-test).
aInstead of running separate regressions within each socioeconomic category, in this regression
we have included the socioeconomic categories as control variables (without interactions).
Figure 4: Number of Enrolled Children in Each Child Care Center
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Each point represents one child care center, and the 805 centers are ordered by
their number of enrolled children in 2011.
31
Figure 5: Distribution of Child Care Centers by Enrolled Children with
Immigrant Background
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Each point represents one child care center, and the 653 centers are ordered by
the share of children with immigrant background that are enrolled. Centers with
less than 10 children excluded.
Figure 6: Family Background Inequality for Enrolled Children Across Child
Care Centers
Share of children with a certain background in the lower and upper decile (of that
certain characteristic) of child care centers (in 2011).
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Table 2: Segregation Indexes for Enrolled Children in Child Care Centers
Disadvantaged Group D-index Gini-index S-index R-index
Immigrant background 0.51 0.67 0.48 1.17
Mother not working 0.36 0.50 0.30 1.05
Parents not married 0.21 0.30 0.38 1.04
Father high-school dropout 0.29 0.40 0.28 1.04
Social assistance 0.47 0.63 0.17 1.01
Disabled parent 0.59 0.72 0.04 1.00
Segregation Within City Districts
Disadvantaged Group D-index Gini-index S-index R-index
Immigrant background 0.38 0.50 0.37 1.18
Mother not working 0.20 0.25 0.21 1.04
Parents not married 0.12 0.17 0.36 1.04
Father high-school dropout 0.18 0.23 0.24 1.03
Social assistance 0.30 0.37 0.10 1.01
Disabled parent 0.19 0.25 0.01 1.00
The four segregation indexes; see Section 4.1 for details. Lower panel is the
average of the index calculated within each of the 15 city districts of Oslo.
Figure 7: Fraction of Children in Child Care Center with Concerningly
Low Score on Test in First Grade
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Each point represents one child care center, and the 611 centers are ordered by
their fraction of children (in 2011) with a concerningly low test score in Norwegian
in ﬁrst grade (in 2010, 2011 or 2012). Centers with less than 10 children
excluded.
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Figure 8: Family Background Diﬀerences Across Private and Municipal
Child Care Centers
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Disabled parent
Social assistance
Mother not working
Father high−school dropout
Immigrant background
Parents not married
Private Municipal
Share of children with a certain family background enrolled in municipal vs
private child care centers.
Table 4: Diﬀerences Across Private and Municipal Child Care Centers
Mean
Diﬀerence
Municipal Private
Family income 921 087 1 231 602 -310 515**
Boy .52 .50 .02*
Concerningly low score
Norwegian .25 .18 .07**
Maths .14 .09 .05**
Number of children 57 40 17**
Immigrant background .33 .14 .20**
Fathers' yrs of educ 12.7 14.3 -1.6**
Number of centers 366 287
For 2011. Diﬀerence over centers (centers are unit of analysis). * and ** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1 percent level (two-sided t-test).
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Figure 9: Family Background Diﬀerences Across Applicants to Child Care
Centers
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Disabled parent
Social assistance
Father high−school dropout
Parents not married
Mother not working
Immigrant background
Lower decile Upper decile
Share of children with a certain family background applying for a slot, lowest
vs highest decile.
Table 5: Segregation Indexes for Applicants to Child Care Centers
Disadvantaged Group D-index Gini-index S-index R-index
Immigrant background 0.51 0.66 0.51 1.21
Mother not working 0.32 0.44 0.37 1.08
Parents not married 0.22 0.30 0.50 1.06
Father high-school dropout 0.26 0.36 0.30 1.04
Social assistance 0.41 0.56 0.17 1.02
Disabled parent 0.45 0.60 0.04 1.00
Segregation within city districts
Disadvantaged Group D-index Gini-index S-index R-index
Immigrant background 0.38 0.59 0.40 1.22
Mother not working 0.20 0.25 0.30 1.08
Parents not married 0.16 0.21 0.48 1.06
Father high-school dropout 0.20 0.26 0.27 1.03
Social assistance 0.25 0.32 0.11 1.02
Disabled parent 0.21 0.26 0.02 1.00
The four segregation indexes; see Section 4.1 for details. Lower panel is the
average of the index calculated within each of the 15 city districts of Oslo.
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Figure 10: Share of children who applied for a slot in public vs private child
care centers
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Municipal Private
Share of children with a certain family background applying for a slot in
municipal vs private child care centers.
Figure 11: Share of children who applied for and attended public vs private
child care centers
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Applied Attended
Share of children with a certain family background applying for/attending
a municipal vs private child care center (fourth analytic sample).
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Figure 12: Simulation of a random draw: Enrollment of children with an
immigrant background
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Light gray dots is observed diﬀerences in share of children from immigrant families
across centers (as given in Figure 5); dark grey area displays the same diﬀerences
resulting from us randomly assigning the children to centers within the child's
city district of residence; whereas the black area displays the same diﬀerences
resulting from us randomly assigning the children to any center in Oslo.
Table 6: Drop in Segregation Indexes in Simulation
D-index Gini-index S-index R-index
Actual Center 0.47 0.63 0.39 1.11
Simulated Center 0.32 0.44 0.29 1.04
The four segregation indexes on immigrant background; see Section 4.1 for details.
The simulation (based on the third analytic sample) let children switch centers to
minimize segregation (on immigrant background), but children are only allowed
to switch center (starting with their actual center) if travel distance from home
to center declines or becomes no more than 500 meters for any of them.
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Figure 13: Simulation of a reassignment of children: Impacts of minimizing
travel distance from home to center and share of children with an immigrant
background
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Light gray dots is observed diﬀerences in share of children from immigrant families
across centers (i.e. third analytic sample which is a subset of centers in Figure 5);
dark grey dots display the same diﬀerence resulting from simulation where pairs
of children switch center if doing so reduces the travel distance from home for
each of them; whereas the black dots display the same diﬀerences resulting from
simulation where pairs of children switch center if doing so reduces the diﬀerence
between the share of children with immigrant background in the two centers given
that the distance from home to the center declines or becomes no more than 500
meter for either of them.
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